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I. INTRODUCTION
A crucial part of the process of innovation is the discovery of new investment proj ects which appear I ex ante, to have attractive returns.
In most real investment projects, information ab out the investment' s future profi tabili ty must be generat ed or discovered by those who will manage that proj ect.
As a result, the managers who discover the project will of ten be better informed ab out that project than will investors who prov ide the necessary capital. While managers may be better informed about projects than will investors, both types of market participants will generally be imperfectly informed about the ability of individual managers. We can expect that managers will make decisions about whether to use investors' capital to undertake risky investments on the basis of how those decisions will affect their own personal returns, including the return on their human capital.
ways to provide the innovation involves
The problem facing investors is to devise
proper incentives for innovation---where the discovery of new investments and decision-making about whether to undertake those investments.
In this paper we are concerned with these incentive problems pertaining to innovation. We will focus on organizations where there is imperfect information about both the characteristics of investment projects and the ability of managers. We will assume that managers in these organization are hired to discover projects which appear to be profitable, ex ante as weIl as to manage those projects in order to produce profits. We assume that managers who have superior ability will be more proficient at both of these tasks, but we also assume that both managers as weIl as all other market participants do not know, with certainty, the ability of individual managers. As a result, managers, as weIl as employers, learn by observing performance, where performance means both the selection of proj ects and the actual returns those projects eventually generate. This paper is devoted to exploring how principals may select contracts to induce managers to make optimal investment decisions, when managers privately observe information which is informative both ab out their own ability and about the value of projects which they may choose to undertake. -Our paper is most closely related to recent papers by Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa [1986] and Christensen [1981] [1982]. Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa consider a model where managers are employed by principals in a firm which lasts for an arbitrary number of periods (at least two). At the end of the initial period, managers observe a signal about the value of a new investment which might be undertaken by the firm and the managers have responsibility for deciding whether the project should be undertaken. In general, managers' incenti ves to undertake the proj ect will differ from those of the principal because the project can produce information about the ability of managers which is valuable to managers but not to principals.
The investment proj ect undertaken by the firm is in part an experiment which generates information about manageriaI ability.
Since managers will make the firm' s investment decision on the basis of the value of the project to principals as weIl as the value of the information generated by this experiment, it is apparent that the manager's decision criterion can diverge from that of the principal. Costa, we will completely ignore the role of investments as experiments which produce information about manageriaI ability.
The assumption that ability influences both the discovery as weIl as the management phases of investment activities implies that managers will learn more about their own ability than will outsiders or principals.
By observing a signal about the value of an investment, a manager acquires information about his own abili ty. Assuming that the market and the manager have common priors about ability and the returns from the discovery process, the n the manager's announcement of the decision to undertake or forego an investment will communicate information about ability.
However, the manager will know the precise value of that signal while the principal will be forced to draw an inference about ability from the dichotomous decision about the project. The asymmetry created prov ides a natural setting for adverse selection problems to develop.-
We will demonstrate that if there were no adverse selection problem, then principals would be able to structure a compensation package, based solely on the observed level of returns actually generat ed by investment, that would induce the manager to follow a first-best decision rule.
However I while such a compensation structure exists, it will never survive the pressures of competitive manageriaI labor markets when the adverse selection probl em is taken into account. Once a compensation function which generates a first-best decision rule for the manager is chosen, the degree of contingency is fixed.
Then, a competing firm can always offer managers a compensation package which has a larger portion of total compensation in contingent form. Managers who are undervalued by their finns, based on the signal they alone have observed, will find the competing compensation more attractive. As a result, the firm which initially employs the manager will be compelled to utilize the more contingent contract in order to remain competitive with other finns who will attempt to bid away i ts ::::.:::-e capable managers.
But there is no limit on the degree of contingency.
The underlying problem here is that the degree or oo~~ingency is
indeterminant, yet contingency is the mechanism used to compete for undervalued managers.
We will show that there is a solution to this adverse selection problem which entails contracts that compel managers to reveal their private information. One way to interpret such contracts is that they involve a prior commitment by the manager to a level of future performance. That is, the contract includes contingent compensation based on deviations of performance from a predetermined target level chosen by the manager. Under one possible contract, the principal will commit ahead of time to a schedule which rewards higher target levels with higher shares of the deviations from the target for the manager. In selecting the target, the manager will understand that the higher the target, the higher the share, but also the lower the expected compensation, for any given share. For any specific function for assigning shares to a target chosen by the manager, the principal can infer the manager's private information from his choice of a -target. However, the principal must choose that function so that the compensation recei ved by the manager is equal to his fair market valuation, given the inside information he has revealed.
We will demonstrate that as long as managers are risk neutral, then there will exist contracts which prov ide for truthful revelation.
Once there is truthful revelation, the n the firstbest investment decision is achievable.
We will demonstrate that one solution to the problem which we have structured is virtually the same as the solution to the problem posed by Christensen [1981J and [1982J. Christensen considers a model of a moral hazard problem where agents choose an unobservable level of effort which affects the returns on a risky investment. Christensen assumes that the manager can also privately observe a signal which is informative about the level of returns on this project. He then studies the propert y of a contract between the principal and agent which is dependent both on the observed outcome of the investment and a message or report from the manager to the principal. In his second paper
Christensen interprets such a message or reporting in light of accounting procedures as a performance standard where the agent is compensated according the deviation between actual performance and some standard. In Christensen's mode l the principal will choose a contract which elicits truthful revelation from the agent. He can never be worse off with such a contract and in at least some instances he will be better off. In our model truthful revelation of the agent I s inside information is important because it resolves an adverse selection rather than a moral hazard problem. Christensen encounters no adverse selection problem since manageriaI ability is not an important part of his mode l and since managers are not allowed to recontract af ter they have observed their private information.
In our~model, since managers will be allowed to recontract when their private information is observed, competing firms will attempt to bid away managers whose ability is undervalued. This competition from alternative firms will induce principals to offer contracts which result in full revelation of private information.
II. THE MODEL

Assumptions
We consider a three-date, two-period model of managerial choice, with time indexed as t = 0,1,2. A manager is endowed with ability level a which is unknown to all market participants.
At time zero, the market and the manager share a prior normal distribution on managerial ability with mean aO and precision ho'
Time period l is a discovery period during which the manager applies himself to the firrn, receives a private signal at t = l, and learns about his ability as well as the"returns that he would generate from taking on a risky project. At time one, the manager uses his newly acquired information to make a dichotomous investment choice between a risky project and a risk free default project with a period-two return equal to R. That is the decision to proceed (not proceed) with the risky project means rejection (acceptance) of the risk free project. Let the periodtwo return generated by the risky investment project, designated X, be the sum of the true ability of the manager who manages that project and a random term, e:
The private signalobserved by the manager at time one is given by z = a + u, where u is a normally distributed random variable with zero mean and precision The signal z determines the expected value of e through a function e(z):
where we assume that e(O) = O, e' > O, and e" < o. Because both the prior distribution on ability and the distribution on u are assumed to be normal, we can express the mean of the manager's posterior distribution on ability at time l, al' for a given z as
To simplify notation, where convenient we will express this as:
In each period, the manager is compensated for the service he provides---either discovery or management. In addition, it is assumed that the manager always has available alternative employment in a spot labor market which involves management of existing projects where he will be paid a lump-sum payment equal -to his perceived ability.-As a result, compensation provided to managers must be competitive compared to that available in spot labor markets.
For simplicity we will restrict our analysis to compensation functions for managing a risky project which are a linear function of
x. However, it should become apparent that our analys is can easily be extended to more general compensation functions.
Compensation in the first period will always be simply a lump Stim payment. Compensation in the second period will depend upon whether the manager chooses to proceed with the risky investment af ter the discovery phase. If the manager chooses to proceed with the risky project he will receive a share in the returns of that project.
If he chooses not to proceed and takes on the risk free project he will receive the lump-sum payment R. Below, R will be taken to be equal to the expected compensation for a risky project which is marginally profitable. Then the compensation in period t will take the form: 
The Investment Decision
At time zero, the principal must dec ide whether to reta in managers in a discovery phase. At time one, managers must dec ide whether to invest in the risky project or the risk free project.
In this section, we will assume that sufficient conditions for the retention of managers are met and we will develop the firstbest decision rule for the manager at time one.
At time one, the risky proj ect is expected to be more or less profitable than the risk free project as > a 1 (z) + e(z) = R. At time zero, the principal must dec ide whether-it is profitable to retain managers to undertake-the discovery phase.
If G (z) represents the period zero distribution function associated with the signal z, the retention of managers in the discovery phase is guaranteed by
In the next section we will analyze the principal's choice of the parameters of the manager's compensation function.
III. THE DESIGN OF A COMPENSATION STRUCTURE Contracts Based on Performance
The principal can affect the agent' s time one decision by ehoosing a compensation function which attempts to induce the agent to obey the first-best decision rule.
In addition, the principal will be able to reta in all the surplus in investment Given that C 2 = R forthose who take the risk free investment, a first-best compensation function will consist of a pair, {W p , s} such that (8) 
< < Equation (8) and the equality version of (9) determine the first-best {w p , s} as
where O < s' < l.
We summarize this result in the following proposition:
Proposition~:
There exists a unique first-best contract defined by the pair {w p I f S l} which induces the manager to make the first-best investment decision at time 1 and which invol ves no expected excess compensation for managers.
Adverse Selection
While there exists a unigue contract which induces the manager to follow a first-best decision rule, this contract is subj ect to adverse selection problems. The difficul ty is that managers who choose to proceed (not proceed) with a project are all valued the same by the market. As a result, a competing firm has an incentive to utilize an alternative type of contract to attempt to induce managers who are undervalued by the market to leave their firm. As long as managers have knowledge of the specific value of z observed during the discovery process, then there will be potential ~or adverse selection.
The specific way in which adverse selection manifests itself in this context is that the principal announces the first-best compensation function {Wp', s'} which will be used to compensate a manager who ehooses to proceed with a risky project in period Any competing firm which observes a specific incentive contract in place will know that it can attract undervalued managers who are compensated with that contract by offering them 13 one which has even slightly more contingent compensation.
Of cours e , when principals are designing these contracts in the first place, they should understand their vulner~bility to adverse selection and should respond by increasing the degree of contingency. However, when principals and agents are risk neutral, there is no l imi t to the degree of contingency which might be included, especially if any functional form for the contract is allowed. Hence, any contract which is announced will be unstable since it can always be improved upon by increasing the degree of contingency. We state this result in Proposition 2 as:
Proposition 2 Any contract based solely on observed return will be unstable in competitive spot labor markets.
The Role of Contracts with Target Performance
The problem with contracts which are based sol ely on the observed return in an investment is that they incorporate no device which allows a manager to reveal inside information to the principal. The asymmetry in information that results makes these contracts vulnerable to adverse selection. However, the re is least one type of contract which can be used to facilitate revelation of information acquired in the discovery process.
This contract includes a target performance level chosen by the manager at time 1. As we will see, his choice of the target performance level will reveal his private information. The problem facing the principal is to select a compensation function which relates contingent compensation to the announced target level in such away that the manager is always compensated at the market level, based on his private information.
We will show that it is feasible and optimal for principals to select such a compensation function.
We will assume that when a manager undertakes a project he commits to a target performance level, X T . Prior to the agent's choosing X T , the principal will announce a function which relates compensation to the announced X T " For simplicity we will restrict our attention to the class of linear incentive compensation contracts with the following characteristics:
where w p is a fixed wage and s (X T ) is the share of the manager' s income over his target performance standard, XT · The expected compensation for managers who proceed with projects will now be:
At time 1 the manager who has chosen to proceed with a project will choose X T in order to maximize expected compensation, given the principal' s announced function for determining s as a function of X T . Hence the manager will solve:
{X T }
The first-order necessary-condition is dLjdX T = -s + dsjdX T (E[Xlz] -X T ) = o.
The first-order condition implies that, for any given function seXT)' we can express X T as a function of z, * * X T = XT(z).
While there will be such an implicit function corresponding to any increasing function s (X T ), the resulting compensation function may not be competitive for any z.
In order to resolve the adverse selection problem, there must exist a function seXT) which provides competitive compensation for any manager who proceeds with a project. That is, seXT) must be chosen so that the compensation expected by the manager is always equal to his perceived ability at time l, given his observed z:
* * E ( C 2 ) = E [w p + s (X T ( z) ) (X -X T ( z) ) I z] = a l ( z), o r * * wp i s(XT(z» (E[Xlz]-XT(z)} = al(z) for z > O (14) and, for z < o. (15) seXT) can be solved simultaneously from the first-order condition (13) and the competitive compensation conditions (14) and (15).
Differentiating (14) with respect to z and using (13), That is, we have shown that in the signaling equilibrium the contract {w p , s(X T )} induces first-best investment decisions and truthful revelation of the manager' s private information, z, by imposing higher performance standard * X T for managers who claim to have high ability. We state this as Proposition 3.
Proposition ~ It is feasible for principals to choose a linear incentive compensation contract {wp, seXT)}' which will cause all
